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Private Giving Crowding Government Funding in Public Higher Education 
 
G. Thomas Sav 
Department of Economics, Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio 45435 
 
Abstract: Problem statement: Private giving and government funding are critical revenue sources for 
public colleges and universities. If increased private giving reduces government funding, then that type 
and extent of crowding out carries important manageri l and public policy implications. Approach: The 
study used a government funding reaction function and an instrumental variable approach to 
empirically estimate the potential for crowding out. Results: The study examined the extent to which 
private giving reduces or crowds out state government funding of public colleges and universities. 
Government free riding was at question and investigated to determine how active it is in terms of 
private donations partially or wholly displacing state government funding. The findings suggested that 
the rate of crowding out was 43% on the dollar. That compares to the 45% political substitution of the
1960’s but is much diminished from the 1980’s dollar for dollar crowding out. Those are aggregate 
comparisons for all public institutions. A disaggreated approach in this study additionally revealed 
that doctoral universities were victims of the same 43% crowd out but that at two other levels, master 
degree granting and associate degree granting colleges, there was the opposite effect of crowding in. 
Those colleges received state funding augmentations of 32-92% on their dollar of privately provided 
donations. Conclusion/Recommendations: The study’s finding of the existence of both crowding out 
and crowding in can carry important policy implications for college and university funding. Future 
managerial and public policy decision making should take that into account. However, political 
sustainability and economy wide and localized effects over time of crowding out and in could prove 
fruitful avenues of inquiry for future research. 
  




 This study examines the extent to which private 
giving reduces or crowds out state government funding 
of public colleges and universities. It is based on the 
notion that private support of public higher education 
can give rise to a reaction whereby state politicians nd 
bureaucrats reallocate available tax dollars away from 
education toward self promoting pursuits. For public 
higher education in the United States, this form of 
government free riding has been empirically examined 
twice. Peltzman (1973) found that during the mid 
1960’s it existed in the form of partial crowding out on 
the order of a 45% reduction in state funding per dollar 
of university funds raised through private donations. I  
the work of Becker and Lindsay (1994) it increased in 
the mid 1980’s to complete or dollar-for-dollar 
crowding out. 
 Indeed, it is puzzling that two more decades have 
passed with the absence of this attention to public 
higher education, especially given the movement from 
partial to complete crowd out. Needless to say, the lay 
literature abounds with articles reporting the continuing 
financial changes taking place in higher education. 
State universities and colleges have been devoting 
greater internal resources to fundraising in pursuit of 
private donations. New competition with the traditional 
flagship universities has arisen as even two-year 
postsecondary institutions are now full force in the 
private fund raising business. Local governments have 
been approached and responded to funding efforts. At 
the same time, colleges and universities have 
experienced reductions in state government funding. 
 In this context, questions arise as to the current 
relationship between public higher education private 
fund raising and state government support. Is complete 
crowding out sustainable? Even partial crowd out with 
enhanced private giving will exacerbate declines in 
state provided revenues. If governments do react 
differently over time, then it is important to explore 
those changes and determine whether or not funding 
displacement continues to prevail. 
 This study attempts to do so by moving forward 
toward the present and using the most recently 
deployed financial data for public colleges and 
universities. Changes in financial reporting 
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requirements incorporated into the data roll over to 
improvements in the empirical work at hand. Alongside 
the much needed updates, a major contribution is 
offered in providing disaggregated estimates of 
crowding out. In addition to aggregate estimates as 
provided in the two previous studies, institutions are 
disaggregated according to Carnegie classifications and 
potential crowding out is examined across four levels: 
Doctoral, master, bachelor and two year degree 
granting colleges and universities. The fiscal year 2006 
results for 1200 institutions indicates a return to partial 
crowding out for the aggregate of those institutions a d 
among doctoral universities as a separate group. In 
contrast, there appears matching funding behavior on 
the part of state governments that actually produces 
crowding in among master and associate degree 
granting public colleges and universities.  
 
Background: Development of the general relationship 
between private and government funding of public 
goods has hinged on the assumption that individuals 
receive utility from private good consumption and the 
total of support to a public good (Bergstrom et al., 
1986). As extensions, the latter has been separated into 
present and past private donor behavior (Andreoni, 
1990). For a pure public good, government and private 
sources are perfect substitutes, one completely 
crowding out the other. If donors are motivated purely 
by the act of giving or a warm glow, then individual 
contributions transform to a private good (Rose-
Ackerman, 1982) and zero crowding out occurs. Bases 
of partial crowd out are necessarily more diverse and, 
e.g., have theoretically incorporated donor-recipient 
utility interdependence (Abrams and Schmitz, 1978). 
 One thread of empirical studies concentrates on 
investigating the extent to which increased governme t 
expenditures displace private giving. The evidence is 
mixed. Often cited are the Abrams and Schmitz (1978) 
crowding out parameter of -0.28 in which a dollar of 
government expenditures on an aggregate of welfare 
programs reduces private charity by 28%. Kingma 
(1989), arguing that reliable estimates require useof 
specific  rather than aggregate public goods, finds half 
(-0.135) that level of crowd out in public radio. 
Manzoor and Straub (2005) re-examination of public 
radio find that it could be five times that magnitude. In 
other studies, there are reports of complete (Roberts, 
1984) crowding out. Recently, interest in the possibility 
of the reverse effect of crowding in has arisen and, at 
research universities, Payne (2001) finds a 65% 
increase in private research donations per dollar of 
increased federal research support. 
 An alternative focus has rested upon the opposite 
notion that private giving crowds out government 
upport. There are two major research pieces that take 
this line of inquiry. Both centers on higher education 
(other studies have scrutinized higher education under 
the crowding out proposition, but in the much narrower 
context of internal resource allocations and the 
fungibility of institutional dollars. Ehrenberg et al. 
(1993) found that federal funding of graduate education 
partially crowded out internal funding in doctoral 
granting universities. Connolly (1997) found that 
external government research funding caused an 
increase in internal research support. That crowding in 
is also a finding of Payne (2001) but it is increased 
private rather than government research giving that 
increases externally provided federal research support 
at research universities). First is Peltzman (1973) 
seminal work on in-kind subsidies. He posits that the
demand for public higher education is tied to the 
political process and that increased private expenditures 
generate a “political substitution” effect whereby 
legislators react by reducing government funding. 
Employing aggregate state level data for 1967, his 
estimated per dollar “coefficient of political 
substitution” is -0.45. 
 Second and within the same framework, Becker 
and Lindsay (1994) contend that self-interested 
governments free ride on private giving. Subject to 
legal or obligated funding constraints, government 
agents pursue their own utility, including vote 
maximization, at the expense of attending to allocative 
efficiencies. Increased private provision of a public 
good tends to weaken constraints, inducing a 
government reallocation reaction and subsequent 
expenditure reduction. Using institutional level data for 
public colleges and universities, their mid 1980’s 
crowding out parameter of -1.07 is a combined state 
and local government funding reduction per dollar of 
institutional funding received from private donors. Not 
significantly different from unity, they conclude that 
private giving results in dollar-for-dollar crowd out.  
 The two studies suggest a movement from partial 
to complete crowding out that raise questions as to the 
current relationship between private charity and fund 
raising efforts on the part of institutions of higher 
education. The remainder of this study turns to that 
relationship at it currently pertains to public colleges 
and universities (Both Peltzman (1973) and Becker and 
Lindsay (1994) do provide separate group estimates for 
public and private schools but find the absence of any
significant relationship between government support 
and private donations among the latter. It is admitted 
that the lack of any correlation is likely due to the very 
small state funding presence in the private sector).  
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
 Our specific interest lies with a government 
reaction function whereby state funding of a public 
college or university is determined and affected by 
specific outputs, performance measures and 
characteristics, but also the level of private donor 
funding. Following the works of Peltzman (1973) and 
Becker and Lindsay (1994), the general reaction 




STATEFUND X PGIVING= α + α + β + ε∑  (1) 
  
where, STATEFUND is the annual dollar amount that 
the institution receives from the state government and
depends upon a set of institutional outputs and 
attributes, X and the annual funding received through 
private giving, PGIVING.  
 In part, state funding is legislated and tied to 
specific institutional outputs and, in part, it flows from 
discretionary pots of monies available for allocation 
and subject to political influence. In all cases, state 
appropriations are a function of college and university 
teaching output as usually measured by student 
enrollments or credit hour production. But state funding 
is also influenced by some loose performance measurs 
that are expected outputs of public colleges and 
universities, including research and public service 
output. There are also institutional characteristics, e.g., 
auxiliary facilities like sports arenas and student 
dormitories, which potentially appeal to or manipulate 
the state political machinery. 
 Private giving is largely the result of fund raising 
efforts, both present and past, of individual colleges and 
universities. Those efforts make potentially new and 
past private donors aware of the educational outputs, 
accomplishments and needs of the institution and offer 
to them that warm glow that they would enjoy from 
being contributors. The process is intended to create a 
permanent donor base and to continuously expand upon
it. Thus it is likely that both current private giving and, 
therefore, state funding are influenced by past givin  
(Andreoni and Payne, 2003; Becker and Lindsay, 
1994). Hence, for empirical estimation of the reaction 
equation, ordinary least squares are not appropriate. As 
with Peltzman (1973) and Becker and Lindsay (1994) 
we employ instrumental variables and in the reaction 




PGIVING X ENDOW= δ + δ + γ + ε∑  (2) 
where, past or lagged private donor funding is proxied 
by accumulated wealth in the form of institutional 
endowment, ENDOW. 
 Upon estimation, whether or not and to what extent 
there  exists  a  displacement  of private for state 
funding is determined by the crowding out parameter, 
β. In particular, crowding out can be absent (β = 0), 
partial (-1<β<0), or complete, if not super, (β≤-1). Of 
course, there are special state government programs 
whereby college and university privately raised dollars 
are partially or even more than dollar for dollar 
matched by state funds. In that event, there could be the 
overall effect of crowding in (β>0). 
 If it is possible for the private provision of public 
higher education to cause state governments to react 
with funding changes, then it also seems plausible that 
the same state governments would react to other 
funding sources, viz., that provided by other 
governments. Becker and Lindsay (1994) empirically 
investigated this notion through the effect of federal 
contributions in the reaction function. Presently, we 
will likewise extend our inquiry in this direction, but 
amend the methodology to include local, in addition t  
state government funding. Thus, it is contended that, 
when feasible, state governments would also free rid
on local and federal government contributions. 
 Our two previous empirical estimates examined 
crowding out for the aggregate of all public colleges 
and universities. That ignores the fact that there ar  
homogeneous institutional groups chartered for specific 
public goods needs that might tend to attract like 
political and donor support. The so-called flagship 
research universities differ from the two year (junior or 
community college) degree granting institutions. All are 
publicly supported and all are engaged in the private 
fund raising game, but they have different missions a d 
during their fund raising drives they peddle different 
goods. In order to capture such differences, our 
empirical work will segment the industry by the 
Carnegie Classification Code and investigate crowding 
out in the aggregate and disaggregated according to 
four institutional levels: doctoral, master, bachelor and 
associate degree granting institutions. 
 
Data: Data for individual colleges and universities are 
drawn from the US Department of Education; National 
Center for Education Statistics, Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) (in 
1988, IPEDS replaced the former National Center for 
Education Statistics data used by Becker and Lindsay 
(1994). IPEDS requires separate reporting by all 
colleges and universities where as previously data were 
combined for parent and child institutions, i.e., main 
campus data was combined with all branch campuses. 
If the latter receive differential private or state funding, 
Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 2 (3): 293-299, 2010 
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then the Becker and Lindsay (1994) estimates would be 
biased. Using IPEDS that problem is currently avoided. 
Also, Becker and Lindsay (1994) arbitrarily eliminated 
colleges receiving less than $50,000 in private support. 
Here, we include such institutions). There is 
considerable annual lag in the assembly and release of 
final data sets. The most recently available is for the 
fiscal year 2006 and is used here. The finance, 
institutional characteristics and enrollment surveys 
from IPEDS are combined to produce a useable data set 
of 1, 210 public universities and colleges, Here that is 
subset by doctoral granting universities (147) and 
master (247), bachelor (54) and two year associate 
degree granting colleges (762) (The Carnegie 
Classification Codes have undergone changes over tim  
but here doctoral combines the two levels of Carnegie 
Doctoral/Research Universities, master combines both 
the Carnegie Master’s Colleges and Universities I and
II levels, bachelor combines both Baccalaureate 
Colleges-Liberal Arts and-General levels and associate 
is a combination of Baccalaureate/Associate’s Colleges 
and Associate’s Colleges. The eight classifications are 
collapsed into four levels based on the fact that, for the 
purposes at hand, the very slight differences in missions 
cannot be reasonably quantified). 
 IPEDS is used to derive institutional revenues from 
sources pertaining to State Funding (STATEFUND), 
Private Giving (PGIVING), Local funding (LOCAL) 
and Federal funding (FED). In attempting to link state 
funding to teaching output we recognize that not all 
teaching is treated equally in state funding formulas or 
given equal treatment in discretionary funding. Also, 
different teaching has different visibility that can shape 
private giving. IPEDS allows us to include teaching 
variability according to three outputs, Undergraduate 
(UGRAD), Professional (PROF) and Graduate (GRAD) 
teaching. Each is measured as full time equivalent 
enrollments. Medical school enrollments are not 
available, but the schools are highly visible, produce 
external community benefits and one would think they 
are usually productive in creating special governmet 
and  private  support. Thus, we include a dummy variable 
for the presence of a Medical school (MED). With 
reluctance but believed to be out of necessity, to control 
for possible remnants of any racial discrimination in 
educational funding on either funding side, the 
Percentage of student enrollment that is Black 
(PBLACK) is incorporated as a funding determinant. 
  Research and service, the other large portions of 
college and university production and presumably 
affecting government support and valued by private 
donors, are more controversial in measuring. Like 
others (Cohen et al., 1989) it will be necessary to 
assume that the available financial data on institutional 
expenditures correlate with production. From IPEDS, 
the proxies are, therefore, annual Research (RES) and 
public Service (SER) expenditures. 
 The campus auxiliary facilities serve a variety of 
constituents whether they are sports arenas, 
entertainment complexes, food services, or 
dormitories. They are either directly or indirectly 
subsidized through state funding mechanisms and a 
plethora of fund raising undertakings are attached to 
them. As with research and service, the best inter-
institutional measure available is the annual 
expenditures on Auxiliary enterprises (AUX). 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 Table 1 contains a summary of the variables along 
with their means and standard deviations for all 1,210 
institutions combined and separately for each of the 
four levels. As expected, doctoral universities, even 
though comprising less than 4% of the institutions, 
command 85% of private giving. Lower level 
institutions on average gather smaller private donati s 
in the both the present and during the past and also 
receive less state support. But the associate degree 
granting colleges produce more undergraduate 
education on average than either the master or bachelor 
level institutions. At the undergraduate level, the 
associates actually serve 60% of the student population. 
 
Table 1:  Variable means and standard deviations by institutional level 
Variable Description All Doctoral Master Bachelor Associate 
STATEFUND State government funding, $ 40.0 (68.5) 171.9 (122.5) 44.8 (30.2) 15.3 (10.4) 14.8 (14.60) 
PGIVING Private giving, $ 3.1 (12.8) 21.5 (31.0) 1.3 (1.8) 0.7 (1.9) 0.3 (1.1) 
UGRAD Undergraduate FTE 11273 (9996) 19648 (9024) 9345 (5999) 3933 (2406) 10802 (10596) 
PROF Professional FTE 87 (381) 668 (883.0) - - - 
GRAD Graduate FTE 1205 (2500) 6167 (3442) 2177 (1812) - - 
PBLACK Percent black enrollment 13.7 (18.0) 10.7 (15.8) 15.8 (23.5) 16.1 (25.7) 13.4 (15.5) 
MED Medical school (if so = 1) - 0.4 - - - 
RES Research expenditures, $ 14.4 (5.9) 113.0 (134.0) 2.9 (5.0) 0.7 (1.2) 0.02 (8.2) 
SER Public service expenditures, $ 6.1 (2.2) 39.2 (50.4) 3.8 (5.3) 1.6 (2.0) 0.8 (1.7) 
AUX Auxiliary enterprises, $ 12.6 (2.9) 66.2 (58.1) 13.3 (11.1) 6.0 (4.9) 2.5 (3.1) 
LOCAL Local government funding, $ 10.0 (2.2) 31.2 (46.6) 1.9 (4.4) 0.8 (1.5) 9.3 (15.3) 
FED Federal government funding, $ 19.6 (5.9) 114.5 (136.0) 10.8 (10.3) 5.0 (5.0) 5.2 (5.7) 
ENDOW Institution endowment, $ 38.6 (2.1) 275.6 (543.2) 16.5 (24.0) 9.5 (39.0) 2.3 (6.3) 
N Observations 1210 147 247 54 762 
Note: For presentation, all dollars are presented in millions; FTE: Full Time Equivalent      
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Table 2: Private giving estimates by institutional level 
Variable All Doctoral Master Bachelor Associate 
INTERCEPT 81979 (302990) 365592 (3861106) -135034 (228514) 13319415 (2148) 87099 (63948.000) 
UGRAD 100.80* (22.72) -252.41** (253.73) 76.59* (27.32) 89.32* (36.99) 20.52* (5.260) 
PROF 1169.72 (835.23) 4896.55 (2646.82) - - - 
GRAD -324.64* (113.61) 607.09 (673.15) -68.88 (74.09) - - 
PBLACK -737940 (968867) -2264728 (9103219) -128083 (484479) 647128** (339045) 258903 (241960) 
MED -4143084* (102363) -7076060** (3705092) - - - 
RES 0.196* (0.013) 0.301* (0.047) 0.0590* (0.0240) 0.056 (0.082) 0.0450 (0.4470) 
SER 0.243* (0.013) 0.022 (0.036) 0.0060 (0.0220) 0.06 (0.055) 0.0110 (0.0230) 
AUX 0.073* (0.010) 0.083* (0.033) 0.035* (0.0100) -0.004 (0.018) -0.0030 (0.0130) 
LOCAL -0.109* (0.013) -0.313* (0.062) -0.050* (0.0240) -0.146* (0.052) -0.006** (0.003) 
FED -0.022** (0.012) -0.076** (0.039) -0.0150 (0.0150) -0.063* (0.021) -0.013** (0.008) 
ENDOW 0.011* (0.001) 0.009* (0.004) 0.030* (0.0040) 0.046* (0.002) 0.030* (0.006) 
F 393.99* 35.05* 12.81*0 86.01* 7.66* 
Adj R2 0.781 0.72 0.3020 0.928 0.650 
N 1210 147 247 54 762 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *: Significance at the 5% level or better; **: Significance at the 10% level or better  
 
Table 3: State funding estimates by institutional leve  
Variable All Doctoral Master Bachelor Associate 
INTERCEPT 3002338* (1529192) 7002155 (19093266) 2168199 (2474255) 1533376 (1881521) 327722.000 (787919) 
UGRAD 1737.68* (125.35) 1445.78 (137970) 2989.25* (340.68) 2264.55* (450.9) 1019.06* (90.22) 
PROF 24001.79* (4394.08) 31679.81** (17222.81) - - - 
GRAD 6458.68* (602.58) 6029.51** (3657.29) 2025.97* (827.51) - - 
PBLACK 37160 (49273) -63657 (451541) 29975 (53081) 177210* (42056) -3990 (28385) 
MED -5072463 (5862669) -5904956 (23672360) - - - 
RES 1.474* (0.121) 1.708* (0.585) 0.284 (0.288) -0.038 (1.013) 10.903* (5.200) 
SER 0.952 (0.066) 0.623 (0.184) -0.584* (0.246) 0.519 (0.678) 0.054 (0.275) 
AUX 0.795* (0.069) 0.818* (0.237) 0.136 (0.033) 0.761* (0.218) 0.267** (0.160) 
LOCAL -0.627* (0.092) -0.893 (0.678) -0.450** (0.276) 0.254 (0.648) -0.302* (0.042) 
FED -0.246* (0.059) -0.430* (0.202) 0.587** (0.163) -0.654* (0.253) 0.533* (0.102) 
PGIVING -0.434* (0.056) -0.427* (0.187) 0.318* (0.173) -0.387 (0.524) 0.921* (0.2430) 
F 510.20* 25.82* 65.25* 12.59* 113.38* 
Adj R2 0.822 0.661 0.71 0.643 0.591 
N 1210 147 247 54 762 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *: Significance at the 5% level or better; **: Significance at the 10% level or better 
 
 Table 2 and 3 present the regression results for the 
first and second stages respectively (in each case, 
Hausman’ specification test was employed to determine 
if the instrumental variables method was preferred to 
the more efficient ordinary least squares. In all cses 
except the bachelor level group, the ordinary least 
squares method was found to be an inconsistent 
estimator at the 1% and better level of significance. The 
ordinary least squares estimates for the bachelor lvel 
institutions, however, did not seem to warrant panic nor 
a replacement of the instrumental variables estimates, 
especially given the small presence of bachelor degee 
granting colleges group in the public sector and our 
analysis. The gain in R2 was less than 1% and the 
private giving coefficient only changed from a negative 
0.387-0.351). Turning to the main thrust of the inquiry, 
the empirical estimates provided in Table 3 support the 
proposition that among publicly controlled state 
colleges and universities, state government funding 
responds to private provision. When government 
reaction to private giving is based on the aggregation of 
All (All) institutions, there is partial crowding out to the 
extent of a 43% reduction in government funding per
dollar of private fund raising. The two prior empirical 
studies are based on that kind of aggregation and, thus
the current 43% compares to Peltzman’s 45% political 
substitution during the 1960’s, down considerably from 
Becker and Lindsay’s complete 1980’s dollar-for-dollar 
crowding out. 
 Yet unlike both those studies, the disaggregation 
approach undertaken here appears to be fruitful in 
uncovering quite a different crowding picture across 
different institutional levels. The results reveal n 
unbalanced government reaction. Crowding out as it 
pertains to the estimated PGIVING coefficient only 
exists within two of the four institutional levels, 
doctoral universities and bachelor degree granting 
colleges. The state-private 43% displacement at 
doctoral universities far exceeds the 4% for bachelor 
degree colleges, but the latter is statistically 
insignificant. The doctoral effects tend to have an 
overwhelming power in influencing the aggregate (All) 
estimates. That derives from the observed reactions in 
the other two levels where state government support 
responds positively to private charity. In both master 
level and associate level colleges, state governments 
Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 2 (3): 293-299, 2010 
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match successful private fund raising efforts: 
approximately 32 and 92% on the dollar, respectively. 
This crowding in is apparently buried in the aggregat  
“All” estimates provided here and therefore quite lik ly, 
in the two previous studies. That there does exist 
political complementarity is encouraging, especially in 
defense of successful college and university fund 
raising. 
 From the state government reaction estimates, there 
emerges evidence of free riding on other government 
funding. In the aggregate and across all institutional 
levels, Federal dollars (FED) substitutes for state 
dollars in the funding behavior of state decision makers. 
It varies from 25% displacement in the aggregate of all 
institutions to 65% for the small group of bachelor 
degree granting colleges. And while the funding stakes 
are generally smaller at the Local (LOCAL) 
government level, there is significant per dollar crowd 
out evident in the aggregate, but when disaggregated it 
appears only at the master and associate level 
institutions. Still, those two combined make up more 
than 80% of publicly controlled higher education 
institutions. Of the remaining determinants of state 
funding decisions, the majority of results are as 
expected. In practice, state funding related to teaching 
output is almost universally formula driven and that is 
borne out here with respect to UGRAD, PROF and 
GRAD. It is comforting that we can reject any 
significant presence of racial discrimination (PBLACK) 
in the state mechanism. In fact, there are rewards for 
student diversity and significantly so at bachelor level 
institutions. Against expectation, the MED coefficient 
is negative but without statistically significant effects. 
It’s suspected that they are institutions in themselves 
and their autonomy is not captured in the financial data 
via IPEDS. With only two exceptions, research and 
service output along with auxiliary enterprises carry 
positive funding impacts, but as would be further 
expected with varying degrees across college and 
university levels. 
 Returning to the instrumental variable estimates of 
Table 2, the results on private giving are equally 
interesting even though the overall explanatory abilities 
are weaker, especially so in the master level group f 
colleges. But it is true here that college and university 
private fund raising is more lucrative the larger the past 
donor base (ENDOW). However, according to our 
estimates, private donors do react negatively to Local 
(LOCAL) and Federal (FED) government support. Aside 
from the weaker results in the master level colleges, that 
crowding out is everywhere present. All in all, theresults 
with respect to individual determinants are in line with 
that given above for state funding. Private donors also 
elect government decision makers. Hence, the funding 




 Based on this research, government free riding 
appears to be alive and well and implies that private 
fund raising in public higher education partially crowds 
out state government funding at the rate of 43% on the 
dollar. That is based on an aggregate of some 1,200 
colleges and universities in 2006. It is on the same 
order as Peltzman’s 1960 political substitution of 45% 
but considerably diminished in comparison to Becker 
and Lindsay’s 1980 dollar-for-dollar crowding out. 
 The present finding of crowding out decline is by 
itself significant for the revenue implications of 
successful private fund raising on the part of public 
colleges and universities. However, the current research 
is believed to offer even wider contributions. 
 Unlike the two previous works, the current study 
expands upon the methodology and examines the 
crowding out proposition by disaggregating public 
higher education institutions according to their 
Carnegie Classification Code. The relationship betwe n 
state and private support is investigated separately for 
doctoral, master, bachelor and associate degree granting 
colleges and universities. That unbundling proved to be 
empirically productive in revealing that state 
government reaction to private giving is substantially 
different among different institutional levels. Powerful 
partial crowding out on the order of 43% is found to 
persist among doctoral universities. But in contrast, the 
opposite effect actually prevails in the master and 
associate level colleges and universities. Their private 
fund raising dollars are rewarded with additional st te 
funding on the order of 32% and 92%, respectively. 
The two groups combined comprise 83% of the public 
institutions and serve 77% of the undergraduate student 
population. In that sense, the funding complementarity 
disclosed herein weighs favorably for the future 
financial well being of a large segment of public hgher 
education. 
 But there are some cautions in order. They rest first 
on the additional finding and in support of previous 
work that state governments react to other government 
funding and tend to free ride on local and federal 
support of their publicly controlled colleges and 
universities. Second, there remains the question of 
political sustainability over time of any free riding, 
crowding out, or now crowding in. And third whether 
or not any of these funding reactions are subject to 
economy wide, regional, or localized economy effects, 
have not been rigorously addressed here or elsewher. 
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Additional research along all these lines would 
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